ABSTRACT This paper proposes a pricing strategy for energy management in the electricity market composed of one generation company, multiple competing utility companies, and consumers with heating, ventilation, and air conditionings, which participate in demand response to keep the electricity real-time balance. The utility company plays the role of an intermediary agent between the generation company and consumers. We model the cost of the utility companies from the demand-side regulation and give the condition of a unique optimal regulation price. For the multiple competing utility companies, we demonstrate that the retail pricing game belongs to the supermodular game and the game exists a pure Nash equilibrium. The uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is also proved, and then a distributed algorithm is developed to search for the optimal equilibrium price. Furthermore, we study the influence of the wholesale price on the equilibrium. Finally, numerical results demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed pricing strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory has been widely applied in the deregulated electricity market, in order to model the interactions among the utility companies, generation companies, and consumers. For example, the authors in [1] - [4] used the non-cooperative game to study the cost minimization of interactive consumers and the large populations of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) with disturbances and delays. The negotiation game and mean field game are applied to study data sharing and electric vehicles charging in [5] and [6] , respectively. In [7] , a contract game was proposed for energy trading between the electricity suppliers and consumers with asymmetric information. Stackelberg game was developed to formulate the energy trading between the consumers and multiple utility companies and the energy exchange between the PEVs and the smart grid [8] - [10] . In [11] , a two-level game approach was developed for the multiple utility companies and multiple consumers, where the consumers and the utility companies participate in an evolutionary game and a non-cooperative game, respectively. Solving potential games with dynamical constraints and improving the Pareto efficiency with punishment mechanism were developed in [11] and [12] . Based on the signaling game and evolutionary game, the incentive mechanism and bidding strategy in the electricity auction market were proposed in [13] and [14] , and the double-sided energy auction was formulated in [16] under price anticipation. Considering the incomplete information among the consumers, Bayesian game for energy management was proposed in [17] - [19] . An adaptive learning algorithm to seek the Nash equilibrium for the energy trading game with incomplete information was proposed in [20] . Repeated game was utilized to improve the Pareto efficiency for the demand response [21] . In [22] , the authors analyzed the cooperation between the small-scale electricity suppliers (SESs) and end-users (EUs) based on the coalitional game.
In the electricity market, the electricity real-time balance is the main task of the power system. Thus, we introduce the demand response into the power system to match supply with demand. Demand-side management (DSM) is a promis-ing method to transform traditional power grid into a more reliably and economically operated smart grid [23] - [26] . Generally, the regulation service is defined by North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) as the provision of generation and load response capability, which responds to automatic control signals issued by the system operator updated every four seconds [27] . Recently, the aggregated flexible loads, such as thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs) are proposed to provide regulation service due to low cost and fast ramp rate [28] , [29] .
The above work studied the game problem with one pure Nash equilibrium. However, there are multiple Nash equilibriums in the reality, thus we use a supermodular game to solve the problem with multiple Nash equilibriums. When the game has multiple Nash equilibriums, it must exist a maximum equilibrium and a minimum equilibrium. The maximum equilibrium is an accumulation point equilibrium, and each player will select the accumulation point equilibrium to maximize their utilities.
In this paper, we formulate a supermodular game among the multiple competing utility companies. The utility companies maximize their revenues by setting appropriate retail prices. When the game has multiple Nash equilibrium prices, it exists a maximum price and a minimum price. The maximum price is an accumulation point equilibrium, and the utility company is more inclined to adopt this price. Then we develop a distributed algorithm to search for the optimal retail price. Moreover, we introduce the consumers with heating, ventilation, and air conditionings (HVACs) participating in the demand response to keep the electricity real-time balance and reduce the financial cost. We have three contributions in this work:
• We establish a cost model for the consumers with HVACs participating in the demand response based on the historical regulation signals and motivate the consumers to increase their regulation capacities.
• We formulate a supermodular game among the multiple utility companies, and the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium price is proved.
• We propose an iterative algorithm to search for the optimal price and analyze the influence of the wholesale price on the equilibrium price. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Some preliminaries are given in Section II. In Section III, the system model is formulated, and the cost of the utility company from demand-side regulation is modeled. In Section IV, the supermodular game is formulated among the utility companies, and the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium price are proved. Numerical results are given in Section V, and conclusions are summarized in Section VI.
II. DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first define the supermodular game and then give some of the basic properties of this game. The supermodular game is closely related to the theory of lattice [30] , [31] . 
Definition 1: Consider a function F: X × T → R, where X , T ⊂ R. The function F has the character of the increasing difference about variable (x, t), if F(x , t ) − F(x, t ) ≥ F(x , t) − F(x, t) for ∀x, x ∈ X and ∀t, t ∈ T when x ≥ x and t ≥ t. The function F is also increasing difference about variable (x, t) if the function is second-order continuously differentiable, i.e., 
is a strategic game where N = {1, 2, · · · , n} is a set of participants, A i ⊂ R represents participant i' action set, S is an exogenous parameter set of the game,
The game is a supermodular game if the action set A i is a sublattice for R and the payment function F i is increasing difference about its action and other player' actions.
Definition 4: The supermodular game must have pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and if the equilibriums are multiple, there exist a maximum and a minimum Nash equilibrium; when the participant' payment function is smooth and ∂ 2 F i ∂α i ∂s ≥ 0 satisfies, where i ∈ N , α i ∈ A i , s ∈ S, the maximum and minimum pure strategy Nash equilibriums are nondecreasing with the parameter s.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a bi-level electricity market composed of one generation company, multiple utility companies, and thousands of consumers with HVACs, as shown in Fig. 1 . The utility company plays the role of an intermediary agent between the generation company and consumers. The utility company purchases the electric power from the generation company at a wholesale price and then sells it to the consumers at a retail price to maximize its profits. In the electricity market, the electricity real-time balance has an important influence on the stable operation of the power system. Therefore, we propose to use the HVACs to provide regulation service for the electricity market, in order to match supply with demand and reduce the financial cost. To be specific, the consumers can respond to the price and increase their temperature deadbands of the HVACs, which can improve the regulation capacities for the utility company. The utility company sets the price for purchasing the regulation capacities based on the market regulation signal, e.g., automatic generation control (AGC) signal. Therefore, the net profit of the utility company i is defined as
where
is the cost of the utility company for purchasing the consumers' regulation capacity, 
IV. COST FOR PURCHASING REGULATION CAPACITY
In this section, the cost of purchasing the regulation capacity is formulated for one utility company, and the index ''i'' is omitted for convenience. The consumer can increase its profit by enlarging the temperature deadbands of the HVAC at the expense of discomfort, which can be characterized by different types of functions such as the quadratic function [32] , [33] , the power function [34] , and the linear weighted function [35] . Without loss of generality, we select the quadratic function to denote the discomfort cost of consumer
and
where 
and where p u and p d are the prices for purchasing up-regulation and down-regulation services at the demand side. (T u m ) max denotes the maximum upper bound of the temperature deadband when the price is higher than the maximum up-regulation price (p u m ) max , and (T d m ) min denotes the minimum lower bound of the temperature deadband when the price is higher than the maximum down-regulation price (p d m ) max . Modeling the aggregate HVACs as a stochastic battery with dissipation [29] , the up-regulation and downregulation capacities of the aggregate HVACs can be denoted as
where ζ m is calculated by the physical parameters of the HVAC. The up-regulation and down-regulation capacities of consumers can be approximated to continuous and concave functions of the prices when the number of consumers is extremely large, as shown in Fig. 2 . We denote the approximated response functions as x u = g(p u ) and x d = h(p d ). However, the aggregated HVACs cannot track the regulation signal when the state-of-charge (SOC) signal falls out of the regulation capacities, and the utility company has to use the generation-side regulation to provide the regulation service until the SOC signal falls into the regulation capacities again [29] . It is intuitive that the cost of generation-side regulation will be decreased with the regulation capacities, which is related to the payment of the utility company. The regulation energy that is consumed at the generation side can be calculated as E g = αE, where E is the total regulation energy and α is the probability of using the generation-side regulation. This probability is related to both the regulation capacities and the SOC signal, which is uncertain to the utility company when purchasing the up-regulation and down-regulation capacities from the consumers with HVACs. However, the utility company can generate the distribution of the SOC signal from the historical data. Supposing the distribution of the SOC signal is denoted as f (x), we obtain the probability of using the generation-side regulation
where x denotes the SOC. Then, the cost of generation-side regulation can be denoted as
where p g is the generation-side regulation price, and the payment for purchasing the regulation capacities is defined as
Then, the regulation cost can be formulated as
The objective of the utility company is to minimize the regulation cost by setting the optimal regulation price for purchasing the regulation capacities, i.e.,
Next, we give the condition to guarantee a unique optimal solution (p u * , p d * ) in the following theorem: 
. Taking the second partial derivative of C u and C d with respect to p u and p d , respectively, we have
and dp u > 0,
Thus, C u is a convex function of p u , and C d is a convex function of p d , and the optimization problem (P1) has a unique optimal solution (p u * , p d * ).
Next, we use the iterative algorithm to obtain the optimal regulation price:
where α k is the step size
V. PROFIT ANALYSIS OF THE UTILITY COMPANY
In general, the electricity demand is stochastic and can be expressed as
where p = (p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p i , · · · , p n ) is a price vector and p i is utility company i's retail price. i ≥ 0 is a random disturbance of demand, and the probability density function and the cumulative distribution function are g i (x) and G i (x), respectively. d i (p) denotes the market demand related with the retail price. Without loss of generality, we denote d i (p) = a i − θ i p i + j =i θ ij p j , where a i is the market demand scale of utility company i, θ i is a coefficient that reflects the impact of the utility company i's retail price on the demand, θ ij is a coefficient that reflects the impact of the utility company i's retail price on the utility company j's demand, where
The utility company determines the retail price p i and the order quantity q i to maximize its profits. Meanwhile, it has the right to select the retail price in [p min i , p max i ]. The expected profit of utility company i is
where w i denotes the wholesale price charged by the generation company to the utility company i, S i (q i ) = E min (q i , D i (p)) denotes the expected sale quantity,
Take the derivation of U i (p i ) with respect to q i , we can obtain
Substitute (23) into (21), we have
Then, we can obtain the total profit of the utility company,
. (25) A. THE EXISTENCE OF Nash EQUILIBRIUM
The utility companies determine the retail prices simultaneously, and the price competition is a non-cooperative game. The player is the utility company, the action is to make a retail price for the electric energy. The action set is [p min i , p max i ], the payment function is U ti (p), and the equilibrium is combination of the optimal price strategies of all the players, denoted
, where p * i represents the optimal retail price of utility company i.
Next, we take the derivation of U ti (p) in (25) with respect to p i and p j and obtain
Due to (27) , and according to the definition of increasing difference, the payment function U ti (p) has the character of increasing difference about (p i , p j ). Moreover, each utility company's action set is a closed interval, i.e.
. Thus, the pricing game among the utility companies is a supermodular game.
Theorem 2: The utility company is more inclined to adopt accumulation point equilibriump in the pricing game when there exist multiple equilibrium prices.
Proof: The pricing game has pure strategy Nash equilibrium price p * according to the characteristic of the supermodular game. When there exist multiple Nash equilibriums, p represents a random equilibrium vector exceptp. The arbitrary ith element in p is not larger than the corresponding element inp, i.e.p i ≥ p i . We take the derivation of U ti (p) in (25) with respect to p j (j = i), yields
Since (28) is positive, we can obtain that U ti (p) is increas-
e. the utility company is more inclined to select pricep, which is the accumulative point equilibrium.
B. THE UNIQUENESS OF THE Nash EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we give the condition on the uniqueness of the pure Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3: The pricing game has a unique Nash equilibrium if the utility company i's price
] and the conditions (K 1) and (K 2) hold:
Since the pricing game is a supermodular game, it must have the pure strategy Nash equilibrium. If the equilibrium is unique, it must satisfy the following condition [36] - [39] :
Taking the second partial derivative of U ti (p) in (25) with respect to p i and p j , we have
Comparing (30) and (31), and from conditions (K 1) and (K 2), it can be concluded that −
≥ 0, and the proof is completed.
Next, we develop a distributed algorithm to search for the optimal retail price based on the gradient,
where k is the iterative step and α i is the step size. Next, we give the condition to guarantee the convergence of the distributed algorithm in the following proposition [40] . Proposition 1: The distributed algorithm (33) converges to the equilibrium if the step size satisfies
C. THE IMPACT OF THE WHOLESALE PRICE ON THE EQUILIBRIUM PRICE
In this section, we study the influence of the wholesale price on the equilibrium price.
Theorem 4:
The equilibrium price is nondecreasing with p i and w i if
(35) Proof: According to the characteristic of the supermodular game, we take the partial derivative respect to p i and w i ,
From condition (K 3), we obtain
≥ 0, and thus the equilibrium price is nondecreasing with the retail price p i and the wholesale price w i .
From the above analysis, we can obtain that each utility company can raise the optimal retail price to compensate the operating cost if the generation company raises one or more utility company's wholesale price.
VI. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
In this system, the utility companies compete with each other to maximize their profits by setting the optimal retail prices. Meanwhile, the consumers with HVACs participate in the demand-side management to keep the electricity real-time balance. The system implementation is shown in Fig. 3 .
A. GENERATION COMPANY
The generation company produces the electric energy and then sells it to the utility companies at a wholesale price to maximize its profits.
B. UTILITY COMPANY
The utility companies receive the wholesale price announced by the generation company and then set the optimal retail prices and regulation prices to maximize their profits. 
C. CONSUMER
The consumers accept the optimal retail price sent by the utility company through the smart meters and then determine the optimal energy consumption. At the same time, the consumers with HVACs provide regulation service to match supply with demand.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, some numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the theoretical results. Without loss of generality, we consider the electricity market consisting of one generation company (GC) and three utility companies (UCs). Moreover, each utility company services for several consumers. The demand scale of the three utility companies (UC 1 , UC 2 , and UC 3 ) are a 1 = 15MWh, a 2 = 12MWh, and a 3 = 10MWh, respectively. The parameters of the three utility companies are given in Table 1 -3. Assuming that the stochastic disturbances of the electricity demand follow the exponential distribution and the mean value is 1. From Fig. 4 , we can observe that each utility company has the maximum equilibrium price and the minimum equilibrium price under the normal condition when it has multiple equilibrium prices. In that case, each utility company will adopt the maximum equilibrium price $2.52, $0.84, and $2.06 to maximize their profits according to the characteristic of the supermodular game. The retail price range of each utility company is given in Table 4 . When the power system satisfies the condition of Theorem 3, it has a unique Nash equilibrium price and each utility company will select the Nash equilibrium price to maximize its profit. The retail price and the profit of the utility company versus the iterations of the algorithm are shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 , respectively. In the numerical results provided in this paper, α = 0.001 is selected based on the observed convergence performance and is bounded by equation (34) . The optimal retail prices are given in Table 4 , and the profits of the three utility companies are given in VOLUME 5, 2017 Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 , we observe that the profits of the three utility companies are decreasing with the increasing of wholesale price. The profit of the generation company is increasing gradually with the increasing of wholesale price. Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 demonstrate that the profits of the three utility companies and the generation company will almost remain the same when the demand scale is under the disruption. The profits of the three utility company and generation company with the demand disruption are given in Table 5 . In general, when the generation company increases the wholesale price, the rational utility company will raise the retail price to compensate for these costs.
Furthermore, the convergence characteristic of the optimal regulation price is examined, and the parameters of the consumers with HVACs are given in Table 6 . We assume the consumer response as following:
where η, β, and γ are positive coefficients. The regulation price charged by the utility company to the consumers is shown in Fig. 11 . The algorithm converges to the optimal up-regulation price and down-regulation price $7.43 and $6.58 after 20 iterations, respectively.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study the energy management based on demand-side regulation pricing and retail pricing. We model the cost of the utility company from demand-side regulation and give the condition of a unique optimal regulation price. Furthermore, a supermodular pricing game is formulated for the multiple competing utility companies, and the existence and uniqueness of the NE is proved for the game. Hence, a distributed algorithm was developed to search for the optimal retail price. In addition, we show the influence of the wholesale price on the optimal retail price. In the future, an interesting direction is to formulate a Bayesian game to characterize the problem with incomplete information among the utility companies. 
